The U.S. urgently needs to dicover an effective method for resolving the terrorism problem, and defeating the terrorists. To date our counterterror tactics have often failed, and major terrorist organizations (like al-Qaeda) continue to grow in strength, worldwide. Although the U.S. has scored some victories over terrorist groups, and captured or killed some terrorists, an overall successful solution has yet to be forthcoming.
There are some lessons to be learned from conventional military forces that might be applied to dealing with the irregular tactics of terrorists. Historical evidence shows that Mongol forces were very successful because they generally had tactical and operational superiority. The Macedonians had great military success under the exceptional leadership of Alexander the Great. Napoleon led his armies to victory using innovative operational concepts founded on good intelligence regarding enemy forces. The Romans had a robust tactical doctrine and strong domestic institutions. In every case, the leaders of these military forces were able to make one tactical improvement after another so that opponents in any conflict could not develop effective counter-capabilities against known tactics.
With few exceptions, U.S. military commanders are trained and prepared to use standard or conventional tactics as a means to achieve military victory. President John F. Kennedy knew that irregular or unconventional tactics would be demanded to defeat terrorist and insurgent forces being trained by communist powers starting in the late 1950s. As a result, President Kennedy ordered the creation of U.S. Army Special Forces, and expansion of CIA’s Special Operations Division. During the period 1961-62, these special operations forces had great success in defeating communist Viet Cong terrorists in Vietnam. This success was soon ended when South Vietnam’s President, Ngo Dinh Diem, ordered that these most successful irregular operations be ended.
President Diem feared that irregular counterterror programs acted to strengthen local Vietnamese and minority populations, most of whom really hated Diem for his corruption. At this point in time, Diem asked that U.S. military forces be used to save his country from communist attack. U.S. policy makers agreed to do so, and the politically limited/controlled, conventional military tactics used produced the failed result known to all. The irregular counterterror tactics proven successful, in 1961-62, should have been used and would have probably resulted in the defeat of communist forces. Those irregular tactics were studied and recorded in 1963, by the Research Analysis Corporation (RAC), of Virginia. This study was titled, “Analysis of CIDG (Civilian Irregular Defense Group) Program Success, in S. Vietnam (1961-62).” The primary lesson learned was that leadership failures in Vietnam, and the U.S., prevented use of counterterrorism tactics proven to be successful.
The U.S. had early successes against the Taliban, in Afghanistan, using irregular tactics under the direction of U.S. special operations personnel (U.S. Special Forces & CIA). Later successes were not forthcoming due to use of more conventional tactics, and failures to start an effective “nation building” program. In Iraq, the U.S. military relied on conventional force for four years, until military leaders with irregular and civic action operations experience assumed control. Using these new tactics, our military forces were able to gain the confidence and support of local populations who then turned against the terrorists and insurgents throughout Iraq. Our “surge” of forces helped this to happen, but it was the change in tactics that resulted in most of the success. Moreover, after four years of failed security operations, our troops on the ground had discovered that conventional military force was not really an effective solution.
In the case of terrorist groups, we know that they are innovative and that they do find ways to cause great harm designed to create the fear they hope will achieve the political gains desired. Terrorist leaders are willing to take time, plan carefully, and sacrifice greatly to achieve their ends. If there is a pattern of operations, it is to design new methods of attack that will produce higher and higher levels of fear. Thus, al-Qaeda seeks to develop and use weapons of mass destruction and bioterrorism devices to cause mass panic by attacking the U.S. and other target nations. The purpose of such attacks will be to cause fear at a sufficient level to create economic collapse. Political compromise is not possible because these Muslim fanatics simply want us weakened to the point that the U.S. cannot stop al-Qaeda’s efforts in impose their beliefs on others using all necessary forms of terror. Each and every terrorist group is different so one pattern does not fit all. The basic lesson is that terrorists, as well as related groups such as narcoterrorists and insurgents, are all dedicated to their causes and willing to die for those causes.
On a global basis, the U.N. has identified one major problem due to the estimated 2.9 billion impoverished populations who generally lack potable water, adequate healthful food, safe housing, sanitation, electricity, and meaningful jobs. If they can find jobs, they work for less than US$2 per day. Education is seldom provided for their children, and health services are almost never available. For the most part, these populations live in social, economic, and political isolation in the developing nations where they reside. Historically, the corrupt leaders of many of these nations do not care if they live or die. These people are angry, frustrated, and often willing to support terrorist or insurgent groups offering the hope of a better life. In brief, these are the populations who will provide “seedbeds” to “grow” many future terrorists. Over the years, the U.S. has provided billions of dollars in relief funds for these populations, with most of the money going to corrupt leaders who have used these funds to “fatten” their Swiss bank accounts. If we have any hope of solving the terrorism problem, we must find a way to eliminate extreme poverty.
Terrorist groups can be defeated using selected covert operations to end the funding and support these groups need to survive. At the same time, operations can be undertaken to damage or limit communications, and destroy trust between the members of any one terrorist organization. It is possible to recruit terrorists and motivate them to work against their own terrorist organization because it has been done before. In Vietnam, there was a special program to motivate terrorists to defect with the promise of relocation to a safe area where they could start a new and better life. Once the promise was documented and made known to a few terrorists, the communist Viet Cong organization lost many of their would be terrorists due to defection. The point is that the terrorists can be defeated, and we do have many very good options. We need to improve and transform our counterterror operations to do many things the terrorists will not be looking for. It can and will be done, but I am not giving details for reasons of security. Most of the needed discoveries have been made, and should soon be soon implemented. Other relevant discoveries, and suggested solutions, will be welcomed by those who must act to defeat the terrorists.
